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WORLD LAW 
THE JUSTICIABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
RIVER DISPUTES: A STUDY IN THE 
CASE METHOD 
WILLIAM w. VAN ALSTYNE* 
Two SUMMERS ago, the Centre of the Hague Academy of Interna-
tional Law devoted its faculty seminar to the study of interna-
tional river law. Drawn from eastern and western nations and 
divided into French and English speaking sections, the thirty par-
ticipants prepared papers for presentation and critical discussion on 
various subtopics. The scholarship and the intensity of the seminars 
were gravely impressive. At nearly every turn, however, the dis-
cussions foundered on two points: first, disagreement on whether 
there are sources of international law which tend to establish legal 
principles applicable by a neutral tribunal to the type of problem 
being considered-a disagreement which riddled and ventilated 
nearly every session; second, the generality of the substantive law 
principles offered by each reporter as applicable to his given subject-
a generality so uncircumscribed as to leave the probable result of 
any given hypothetical case almost wholly unpredictable. 
The application of international law to non-navigational uses of 
international rivers has a very substantial bibliography: dozens of 
treaties dating back four centuries, a substantial number of decided 
cases, parallel municipal law practices, and an abundance of treatises 
by highly qualified publicists. These should provide ample bases 
for outlining the law of international rivers in a useful, predictive 
fashion. The international law rule which commands a consensus 
is the same rule which the Supreme Court of the United States will 
apply in apportioning the economic use of interstate rivers when 
there is no overriding federal statute or congressionally approved in-
terstate compact1-the rule of equitable apportionment. The con-
<>A.B. 1955, University of Southern California; LL.B. 1958, Stanford University. 
Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University School of Law; Visiting Associate 
Professor of Law at Duke University, spring semester 1964. 
1 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 562, 565 (1963); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 
U.S. 589 (1945); Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 
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tent of this rule is clear enough to render future disputes over 
international rivers fully justiciable: a neutral tribunal would have 
reasonably clear legal guidelines to employ in the adjudicatory 
process and the litigating nations would not be involved in reckless 
gambling by submitting to a tribunal committed to these guidelines. 
This conclusion is, however, at variance with the considered 
opinion of some very excellent writers,2 including professors Berber 
and Smith who have contributed the most lengthy treatises on the 
subject. In a fairly recent recapitulation of materials which a 
tribunal might employ under article 38 of the statute for the Inter-
national Court of Justice, Professor Berber discouragingly con-
cluded: "It is noteworthy that water disputes are generally agreed 
to constitute a classical example of disputes which cannot be satis-
factorily solved by judicial decision."3 Twenty years after completing 
the first definitive text on the subject,4 Professor Smith was even less 
confident that the judicial process was equal to the task than he was 
in 1931: 
[R]eference to a court is obviously little more than a gamble unless there 
are clear and accepted rules of law which the court can apply to the facts 
before it, and in this matter of international water rights it is unfortu-
u.s. 419 (1922). For a complete bibliography of American interstate water cases, 
see The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV. 
665, 708·18 (1959). 
2 BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 204 (5th ed. 1955); id. at 126 (1st ed. 1928); 
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 218 (3d ed. 1957); De Visscher, Theories et 
Realites en Droit International Public 260·65 (2d ed. 1955); Eagleton, The Use of the 
Waters of International Rivers, 33 CAN. B. REv. 1018 (1955); MacKay, The Interna· 
tional ]oint Commission Between the United States and Canada, 22 A11r. J. INT'L L. 
292, 295 (1928). See also BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 388 (1962); BRIERLY, 'FilE 
OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 42·43 (1944); 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 (2d 
rev. ed. 1947); KAECKENBEECK, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 181 (1918); SIIIISARIAN, THE 
DIVERSION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS 99 (1939); Legal Aspects of Hydro-Electric 
Development of Rivers and Lakes of Common Interest, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, U.N. Doc. No. EjECEj136, at 85 (1952) (herein· 
after cited ECE REPORT]; Report of the Nile Commission, 130 BRmsu & FOREIGN STATE 
PAPERS 112 (1929) [hereinafter cited as BRIT.ST.P.]; Austin, Canadian-United States 
Practice and Theory Respecting the International Law of International Rivers: A 
Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 CAN. B. REv. 393, 399 
(1959); Goldie, International Law and the Development of International River Basins, 
1 U. BRIT. CoLUM. L. REv. 763 (1963); Murphy, The Function of International Law 
in the International Community: The Columbia River Dispute, 1961 MILITARY L. REV. 
181. 
3 BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 (1959); Berber, The Indus Water 
Dispute, 6 INDIAN Yn. INT'L AFF. 46, 60 (1957). See also Scott, Kansas v. Colorado 
Revisited, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 432, 454 (1958); The Problem of the Indu$ and\ Its 
Tributaries: An Alternative View, THE WoRLD TODAY 266, 274-75 (1958). 
• Si.\rrm, THE EcoNo.r.nc UsEs OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 87, 154 (1931). 
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nately true that the law of nations has so far signally failed to keep pace 
with modern developments.5 
There is, however, more in common between these writers and 
some participants in the Hague seminar than erudition and mutual 
discouragement for the lack of an explicit international law on this 
subject. The treatment of the subject has suffered from an approach 
largely given to an effort to deduce a single clear rule from a cata-
logue of authority. Since the doctrine of equitable apportionment 
does not on its face appear to dictate the resolution of any given dis-
pute, it is frequently denigrated as no doctrine at all but only a 
general appeal to international conscience or to a decision ex aequo 
et bono.6 
The ex aequo clause, 7 never yet employed by the International 
Court, fundamentally rests on an agreement by the litigants to trust 
to the good conscience of the court to decide according to its own 
notions of fairness; if the principle of equitable apportionment fits 
no other slot, Professor Smith is doubtless correct that an adjudica-
tion on such a basis would be a gamble. 
Berber and Smith have tried to recover from the apparent dead 
end of the law by suggesting that in the absence of clearly established 
legal principles, riparian states should be encouraged to adjust their 
differences by mutual agreements.8 The suggestion is not, however, 
incompatible with a bolder proposition that certain legal principles 
do exist; indeed, the suggestion that disputes can be resolved without 
reference to established principles may otherwise have unfortunate 
consequences. If there are no general principles limiting the claim 
of a state to all water flowing through its territory, then it would ap-
pear that no upper riparian would concede the legitimacy of a claim 
made by any water-consuming lower riparian except under threat of 
superior force or, if the balance of power were in its own favor, in 
return for disproportionate benefits, e.g., receipt of undue compensa-
tion or an exorbitant share of the economic benefits. This is the 
• Smith, The Waters of the jordan: A Problem of International Water Control, 25 
INT'L AFF. 415, 420 (1949). 
0 BERBER, SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE STUDY ON THE 
USES OF THE "\VATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 5 (1957); Andrassy, Koriscenje voda 
prema rezoluciji, International Law Association u New Yorku, 9 ZBORNIK PROVNOY 
FAKULTETA U ZAGREB 236 (1939); Smith, supra note 5, at 415. 
7 STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 38, para. 2. 
8 For a brief discussion, see BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 266-67 (1959); 
BERBER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 5. 
310 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1964: 307 
natural course of extralegal negotiations, in contrast with the course 
of events where the negotiating position of each party is bottomed on 
a conviction that an influential and neutral third party, whether it 
be a court, an international bank, or a consensus of other states, 
would accommodate their interests differently in accordance with 
basic legal postulates. 
An entirely separate development which would appear extraor-
dinary indeed if there are really no emergent legal principles is the 
argument that there exists a duty under international law to submit 
water disputes to arbitration in the event that mutual agreement 
cannot be reached. This "duty," described by John Laylin four 
years ago,9 was enlarged upon recently in Laylin's report to the ILA 
Committee on International Rivers, at The Hague.10 Almost simul-
taneous with the last event was the adoption of a nearly identical 
recommendation by the Institut de Droit International.11 This 
duty, to arbitrate interests which appear irreconcilable by negotia-
tion, purportedly results from the fact that most riparian states are 
members of the United Nations and that they have renounced the 
use of force as a means of settling international differences.12 With 
this limitation upon the power of the state which objects to a pro-
posed use, the proposing riparian "cannot pursue a course of 
unilateral action in derogation of the agreement by other parties to 
the dispute to abstain from taking the law into their O'\VU hands."13 
Thus, the proposing state may not proceed with its project if an 
objection is made by a co-riparian, unless the objecting state is itself 
unwilling to arbitrate. The objecting state may therefore delay the 
proposed use "if it is willing to have the validity of its objection 
tested by third-party determination.''14 
Support for this bilateral duty to arbitrate is found in a United 
State Senate document which purports to set forth the State Depart-
ment's understanding of principles of international law: 
• Laylin &: Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication in International River Disputes, 53 
AM. J. INT'L L. 30 (1959). 
10 Laylin, Report on the Rights and Duties of Parties to a ·water Dispute Pending 
Its Solution by Peaceful Means, Int'l Law Ass'n Committee on the Uses of the ·waters 
of International Rivers, (Den Haag, Aug. 30, 1961) [hereinafter cited as Laylin Report]. 
11 Texte Definitif de Ia Resolution tel qu'Adopte au Cours de Ia Seance, Sept. 11, 
1961, arts. 6-8 reprinted in 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 737, 738 (1962). 
12 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3. 
13 Laylin Report. See also Note, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1961). 
u Lay lin &: Bianchi, supra note 9, at 36-37. 
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If the coriparian, in good faith, objects and demonstrates its willing-
ness to reach a prompt and just solution by the pacific means envisaged 
in Article 33 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations, a riparian is under 
a duty to refrain from making, or allowing, such change, pending agree-
ment or other solution.15 
Mr. Laylin asserts that the duty to arbitrate is generally sup-
ported by treaty practice, and that at least sixty-six states have made 
agreements of this type, affecting international rivers.16 Two ma-
jor river treaties executed within the last three years expressly bind 
the signatories to compulsory arbitration,17 although a third treaty, 
affecting the Nile, contains no similar provision.18 
But the point here is not to prove or disprove the existence of a 
legal duty to submit water disputes to arbitration in accordance 
with general principles of international law. It is, rather, simply to 
underscore the assumption implicit in any such duty, that there 
necessarily exists some body of law for a court of arbitration to ap-
ply! The duty to arbitrate is not confined by its proponents to 
treaty signatories or to questions involving merely the interpreta-
tion of treaties which may supply their own law ad hoc. Rather, it 
allegedly applies between riparians who have simply fallen into dis-
agreement as to the right of one to make a particular use of a com-
munal river. To stipulate that these parties must submit to an 
arbitral decision based on international law surely assumes that 
there is a sufficient body of law to make such a process useful; other-
wise the duty to arbitrate comes to nothing, since the commission 
would be obliged to dismiss the case for want of sufficient substantive 
rules to adjudicate the dispute. The parties would thus be returned 
to the same stalemate which the duty to arbitrate is designed to 
avoid. 
Neither do these agreements to submit to arbitration suggest that 
the parties intend that the tribunal is to decide ex aequo et bono-
more or less according to its own conscience. Such an uncharted 
departure from legal protections of sovereign interest is not to be 
lightly suggested. Thus, notwithstanding the diffidence of some, it 
10 Griffin, Legal Aspects of the Use of Systems of International Waters, S. Doc. No. 
liB, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1958). See also Griffin, The Use of Waters of International 
Drainage Basins Under Customary International Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 50, 79 (1959). 
1o Laylin Report at 10. 
17 See Columbia River Treaty, 44 DEP'T STATE BULL. 234, 239 (1961); Indus Waters 
Treaty, 123 WoRLD AFF. 99 (1960). 
18 See 13 Mm. EAsr J. 422 (1959). 
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is evident that not every state or every author insists that disputes 
involving the economic uses of international rivers are non justiciable 
for lack of a sufficiendy developed body of international law. 
It is submitted that equitable apportionment is considerably 
more of a legal doctrine than is sometimes supposed, and that it will 
provide a justiciable basis for a wide variety of real international 
disputes. The persuasiveness and clarity of the principle can be 
made most apparent through its application to a representative series 
of cases rather than through the more orthodox technique of draw-
ing a chain of authority around the general proposition itself. In 
what follows we shall be concerned with matured fact situations 
setting forth concrete disputes between two or more nations tra-
versed by a common river, where one of the nations proposes to 
make some economic use of the river in a way which antagonizes 
another riparian claimant. The cases are arranged to move from 
the easier to the more difficult, the better to illustrate some aspect 
of equitable apportionment. 
CASE l 
The Z River flows through states X and Y, X being the upper 
riparian. X proposes to construct a dam along the Z River; the 
dam will provide power for several domestic hydroelectric projects. 
The water passing the dam will be returned to the Z river bed to 
cross the border into Y in the same amount, at the same rate of 
flow and, for all practical purposes, as though it had never been 
involved in the project. Nevertheless, Y objects to the project and 
asserts that its consent is indispensable as a condition precedent to 
the use of the Z River by any other riparian. Y bases its objection 
on a claim of absolute territorial integrity. 
During the ensuing arbitration proceeding, Y enlarges upon its 
objection by asserting the inviolability of prior consent as a custom-
ary rule of international fluvial law recognized by civilized states 
and evidenced by a substantial number of treaties. Y points out, as 
an example, that the Prussian-Netherlands Treaty of 1816 fixed 
certain frontiers and provided: "[Neither State] shall make any 
alteration whatever in the course of the rivers or in the actual banks 
of the rivers, nor grant any concession or diversion of water, without 
the consent and agreement of the two Governments."19 A Finnish-
10 Traite de Limites entre Leurs Majestes le Roi de Prusse et le Roi des Pays· Bas, 
June 26, 1816, 3 BRIT.ST.P. 720, 729 (1815-1816). (Author's translation; emphasis 
added.) 
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Russian Treaty of 1922 similarly provided that: "Waters may not 
be diverted from the watercourses ... unless a special agreement has 
been concluded in each case between the Contracting States."20 
A Costa Rican-Panamanian Treaty of 1941 stipulated at article 5 
that: "Any work either one of the two countries may desire to un-
dertake on the rivers marking the frontier line must be approved, 
in anticipation, by the other party."21 And the ECE Report of 1952 
recommended that: "Any work such as canalization, irrigation, or 
the development of electrical power shall only be undertaken sub-
ject to the mutual consent of both riparian States."22 Y also draws 
from United Nations proceedings to quote the argument of the 
Syrian delegate before the Security Council in 1953, in which he 
insisted with regard to development of the Jordan River: "There is 
no doubt whatever that in this case a mutual prior agreement for 
the use of the waters is necessary before any project can be started 
in connection with them."23 
This case is not entirely hypothetical, and while case decisions 
lack the force of stare decisis in international law, it is clear that a 
neutral tribunal would reject Y's position for the same reasons as 
those employed by the Court of Arbitration in Affaire de Lac 
Lanoux.24 On stipulated facts that waters from Lake Lanoux flow-
ing into Spain would not be affected by French diversions from the 
Carol River which fed the lake and which France sought to use in 
a hydroelectric project wholly within French territory, the Arbitral 
Court upheld the right of France to proceed without Spanish con-
sent. It expressly rejected prior consent as a general principle or 
customary rule of international law investing each riparian with an 
absolute veto power. While the holding is necessarily cast in the 
form of rejecting the Spanish proposition as a rule of law (because 
of the manner in which the case arose procedurally), it virtually as-
2° Convention Between Finland and Russia Concerning the Maintenance of River 
Channels and the Regulation of Fishing on Water Courses Forming Part of the 
Frontier Between Finland and Russia, Oct. 28, 1922, 19 L.N.T.S. 193, 194-95 (1923). 
21 Treaty Regarding Frontiers Between Costa Rica and Panama, May I, 1941, 144 
BRIT.ST.P. 751, 753 (1940-1941). (Emphasis added.) 
22 ECE REPORT 149 (Emphasis added), quoting from Exchange of Notes Between 
the United Kingdom and Brazil, March 15, 1940, 5 U.N.T.S. 72 (1947). 
23 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 8th year, 649th Meeting (SjPV.649) 21 (1953). 
(Emphasis added.) 
24 62 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBUC 79 (1958). Excerpts are 
reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156 (1959). 
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serts that a state may unilaterally develop harmless2" uses of an 
international river within its borders as a legitimate exercise of 
sovereign interest. The decision appears to be equally useful 
whether we are discussing harmless diversions for hydroelectric 
projects, or harmless diversions for recreational purposes such as 
fishing, boating, or swimming. Restated, the Lake Lanoux decision 
holds for the following proposition: The right of territorial sover-
eignty over an international river entitles a riparian state to use 
the river in any manner which will not result in a material alteration 
of the river or of its availability for use as it passes through other 
riparian states. 
Y's position in our hypothetical case, like Spain's in the Lake 
Lanoux arbitration, should be rejected as a matter of reason and 
authority. First, it is arguable that notwithstanding the absolute 
phraseology of the scattered treaty provisions assembled by Y, these 
provisions were intended to apply only when a proposed use by one 
riparian would result in a significant disadvantage to the other 
signatory powers; harmless unilateral uses may not be within the 
common obligation to secure prior consent. Second, even assuming 
these provisions do confer an absolute veto power on each riparian, 
they are contrary to a far greater number of treaties and practices 
which limit the doctrine of prior consent to instances where sub-
stantial harm can be shown.26 Consequently, they may simply 
represent an ad hoc departure from what the signatory states other-
wise understood would prevail as a matter of customary international 
law in the absence of such a special agreement.27 Finally, the special 
•• It is correct, of course, that neighboring states whose use of the river is 
physically unimpaired may still feel politically disadvantaged by the growtlt of power 
which tltcir riparian neighbor may realize from harnessing the river. Explicit in the 
Lake Lanoux decision, however, is the proposition that pacific political advantage 
resulting from an otltcrwisc harmless use of an international river does not constitute 
a legal injury. 
•• A substantial number of these treaties, with supporting comments by highly 
qualified international law publicists, are discussed in Case II, infra. 
27 
"[Treaties] ... may go to show, according to tltc nature of the case and the 
particular circumstances, the existence of general usage which the parties wished 
to record for convenience in apt words and an authentic form (though this is not 
common), or the dissatisfaction of the parties witlt existing usage and their dcsil'e 
to improve on it, or tlte absence of any settled usage at all antecedent to the particular 
agreement. It is, therefore, impracticable ... to make any general statement as to 
the value of treaties and similar instruments as evidence of the law of nations." 
Pollack, The Sources of International Law, 2 CoLUM. L. REv. 511 (1902). Sec also 
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
377-79 (1958). 
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adoption of these veto-power provisions has never been accompanied 
by any declaration that they were required by international law, 
and thus the opinio juris condition is lacking to make them useful 
as evidence of customary law under article 38 of the International 
Court's statute.2B 
As a matter of reason, it should be clear that each nation must 
be free to develop fluvial resources which will advance its economy 
or welfare when no substantial alteration of the river as it flows 
from or into co-riparian states results. Any rule to the contrary 
could operate to frustrate the useful application of a valuable natural 
resource, according to political jealousies of states tempted to invoke 
their veto power for unworthy reasons or for no reason at all-a 
prospect wholly at odds with the principle of equitable apportion-
ment.20 
While the affirmative rule of customary international law de-
ducible from the Lake Lanoux case is necessarily limited to simple 
facts, it is a rule which does contribute to the justiciability of inter-
national river disputes and it makes clear that submission to a 
tribunal under some circumstances ·will not be a gamble. 
CASE II 
State X, the upper riparian, proposes to construct its hydro-
electric plant near the X-Y border. The acceleration of the flow 
occasioned by the river passing through new sluices just on the X 
side, will result in the quickened erosion of irrigation canals in the 
upper part of Y. At a cost of SIOO,OOO (less than I% of the total 
project cost), X could restore the river flow to its original rate of 
movement through Y either by introducing certain concrete water 
breaks into the river on its side of the border-thus promoting its 
own development with no substantial injury to Y-or by removing 
its proposed dam further up the river. X refuses to take either of 
these measures, however, asserting that there is no rule of inter-
national law to proscribe its use of water within its territory ac-
cording to its own inclination. To the contrary, it asserts that the 
•• "We can therefore hold fast to the firmly established proposition that state 
practice alone, even when frequently recurring and carried out over a long period, does 
not constitute sufficiimt evidence of the existence of customary law, but that a 
psychological element-often difficult to verify-must be present, namely, the conviction 
of states that they are bound in law to the particular course of conduct." BERBER, 
RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (1959); see authorities cited id. at 46-47. See also 
FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 62-63 (1934); LAUTERPACHT, op cit. supra note 27, at 
379; 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (8th ed. 1955); Tunkin, Remarks on the 
juridical Nature of Customary Norms of International Law, 49 CAuF. L. REv. 419, 
422 (1961). But see discussion in text at notes 61-65 infra. 
20 See discussion in text at notes 98-112 infra. 
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rule is that sovereign power over all water flowing through one's 
territory is unlimited. 
At the arbitration hearing, X supports its case by relying partly 
on the "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists" that there 
is no international law on point to restrict a state's exercise of its 
sovereignty.30 Additionally X draws upon the whole body of au-
thority accompanying the Harmon doctrine,31 viz., that a sovereign 
may appropriate resources within its territory regardless of the conse-
quences to its neighbors, a rule seemingly acknowledged by Briggs32 
and Kluber,33 and the alleged state practice of India as represented 
by Mr. Sikri.34 
Even so, there is little doubt that an international court would 
possess an authoritative basis for rejecting X's contention, and for 
affirmatively sustaining the objection of Y. The principle finally 
applicable to justiciable disputes of this kind is this: No state may 
use the water of a communal river in a manner which substantially 
and adversely affects other riparians where reasonable means exist 
to secure the same use without adversely affecting the other riparians. 
To establish this principle, the first step is to negative X's claim 
based upon the Harmon doctrine, i.e., absolute territorial sover-
eignty as a matter of international law. This step has already been 
taken by other ·writers.35 The following will do as a succinct 
summary. 
•• See authorities cited note 2 supra. 
31 See BERBER, op. cit. supra note 28, at I4·I9; I HYDE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 
565·72; SIMSARIAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 7I; Austin, supra note 2, at 393; Murphy, 
supra note 2, at I86·87. 
32 
"In the absence of [a special convention between States] ••• national rivers 
and those portions of international rivers which are within the national territory arc 
subject to the exclusive control of the territorial sovereign. No general principle of 
international law prevents a riparian State from excluding foreign ships from the 
navigation of such a river or from diverting or polluting its waters." Bmccs, THE 
LAW OF NATIONS 274 (2d ed. I952). 
33 
"A State ••• is entitled to exploit its territory to achieve its proper objects ••• by 
•.• changing the course of waterways, even if that might turn out to be to the 
detriment of other States," I KLUBER, EUROPAISCHES VOLKERRECHT 128 (1821), quoted 
in ECE REPORT at 52. See Sikri, Principles of Law Governing the Uses of I11temational 
Rivers, I956 REPoRT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAw AssOCIATION CONFERENCE 8 01ercin· 
after cited as INT'L L. Ass'N CONF. REP.]. 
•• India eventually relinquished the position in negotiations with Pakistan and 
the World Bank concerning the Indus River basin. 
•• BERBER, op. cit. supra note 28, at I9-40; Austin, supra note 2; Griffin, The Use 
of Waters of I11temational Drai11age Basins Under Customary Intemational Law, 53 
AM. J. lNT'L L. 50, 69 (1959); Johnson, Effect of Existing Uses on the Equitable AP· 
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The Harmon doctrine finds its basis in the mere opinion of an 
United States Attorney General that the rights of America as the 
upper riparian on the Rio Grande River were unlimited by any 
effect the unbridled exercise of those rights might have on the flow of 
the river into Mexico.36 The doctrine was expressly reserved in the 
American-Mexican Treaty of 1906,37 and it continued to receive lip 
service by the United States untill939.38 It was expressly disclaimed 
as a principle of municipal law in 1922 by the United States Supreme 
Court,30 however, and it has not been applied even during negotia-
tions with Mexico, since 1944.40 Moreover, it is quite clear that 
the "doctrine" was merely an instrument of foreign policy, not only 
because it was never widely supported abroad but also because the 
United States has assumed a radically different attitude when, as a 
lower riparian on the Columbi,a River, application of the doctrine 
would have operated to its distinct disadvantage.41 In granting 
ultimate control to the uppermost riparian, the doctrine places lower 
riparian uses and projects in constant jeopardy. In affirming the 
untrammeled sovereignty of the upper riparian, it senselessly denies 
the claims of lower states in which the communal river may be as 
much or more of a natural, territorial and "sovereign" asset. Ulti-
mately the doctrine has failed to engender support because, as 
persuasively presented by Professor Smith: "[The doctrine of abso-
lute supremacy of the territorial sovereign] is ... essentially anarchic 
... permit[ting] every state to inflict irreparable injury upon its 
neighbours without being amenable to any control save the threat of 
portionment of International Rivers I: An American View, I U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 
389 (1960). 
30 See I MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 654 (I906). 
31 Convention Providing for the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio 
Grande for Irrigation Purposes, May 5, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953 (effective Dec. 26, 1906). 
38 See discussions in the Report of American Section of the Int'l Water Comm'n, 
United States and Mexico, H.R. Doc. No. 359, 7lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1930); Simsarian, 
op. cit. supra note 2. 
30 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 466 (1922). See also cases cited note 1 
supra, squarely identifying equitable apportionment as reflecting the rule to govern 
interstate river disputes. 
•• Treaty With Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and 
Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, arts. 8, 9, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. 994 
(effective Nov. 8, 1945). 
41 Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Treaty with Mexico 
Relating to the Utilization of the Waters of Certain Rivers, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 
at 19·21, pt. 5, at 1738·55 (1945); State Dep't Memorandum, Legal Aspects of the Use 
of Systems of International Waters, S. Doc. No. 118, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1958); 
The United States Position-Diversion of Columbia River Waters, 1956 PAC. N.W. 
REGIONAL MEETING, AM. Soc'Y INT'L LAw 16·18, 21, 35. 
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war."42 Although the doctrine has been said to represent the state 
practice of India,43 there is every indication that this too was merely 
a matter of momentary political expediency to strengthen India's 
position during negotiations with Pakistan concerning apportion-
ment of the Indus River; the treaty settlement of this dispute reflects 
a different principle altogether.44 
Having negatived X's right to use the river with utter impunity, 
it remains to be affirmatively demonstrated that international law 
would support the principle that X must use every reasonable means 
to avoid substantial adverse effects on Y. Material is already abun-
dant on this point and only a summary is presented here. 
From one point of view, the principle is simply an extension of 
the traditional tort maxim that one must use his own property so 
as not to injure others. As restated by Professor Eagleton: 
It seems safe ... to state as a general principle of international law that, 
while each state has sovereign control within its own boundaries, in so 
far as international rivers are concerned, a state may not exercise that 
control without taking into account the effects upon other riparian states. 
This is a negative statement, which I can as confidently put into positive 
form in the old maxim sic utere tuo ut non alienum laedas,41l 
Other authors have arrived at the same point, not from the common 
law tradition, but from Roman law tradition.46 Others, as Pro-
fessor Oppenheim, would ground the principle as an illustration of 
an abuse of right.47 And still others, as Hans Thalmann, derive the 
principle from a more amorphous neighborship law.4B In any 
event, the ovenvhelming opinion of international law publicists 
supports the basic principle.40 
•• SMrm, THE EcoNOMIC USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 144·45 (1931). 
•• See note 34 supra . 
.. See Indus Water Treaty, 123 WoRLD AFF. 99 (1960); text at notes 53, 106 infra. 
See Berber, The Indus Water Dispute, 6 INDIAN YB. INT'L AFF. 46 (1957); 9 FoREIGN 
AFF. REP. 153 (1960). 
•• Eagleton, The Use of the Waters of International Rivers, 33 CAN. B. REV. 1018, 
1021 (1955). 
•• See, e.g., Neumeyer, Ein Beitrag zum internationalen Wasserrecht, FESTSCHRIFT 
FUR GEORG COHN I43-44 (1915). 
17 1 OPPENHEIM, op. dt. supra note 28, at 345-47. 
•• THALMANN, GRUNDPRINZIPIEN DES MODERNEN ZWISCHENSTAATLICHtN NACHBARRECIITS 
159 (1951). 
•• See BATY, THE CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (1930); BERBER, op. cit, supra 
note 3, at 254 (Professor Berber is adamant, however, that the vague and inchoate 
nature of the principle falls short of making it a general principle of law recognized 
by civilized nations or a principle of customary law suitable for application by an 
international tribunal); BRIERLY, LAw OF NATIONS 205 (5th ed. 1955); HALL, INTER· 
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In the same category of authority may be placed the views of the 
International Law Association. Typical of its resolutions during 
conferences over the last decade is the fourth resolution of the ILA 
from its Dubrovnik Conference of 1956: "A State is responsible, 
under international law, for public or private acts producing change 
in the existing regime of a river to the injury of another State, which 
it could have prevented by reasonable diligence."50 The restriction 
on state X is derived not only from the opinions of highly qualified 
publicists who comprise but a secondary source of international law 
authority under article 38 of the I.C.J. statute.51 The principle is 
equally well endorsed by parallel treaty provisions,52 only the most 
NATIONAL LAW 175 (8th ed. 1924); KAECKENBEECK, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 181 (1918); 
SMITH, op. cit. supra note 42, at 151; Cardona, El Regimen ]uridico de los Rios Inter-
nacionales, 56 RIVISTA DE DEREC:fiO INTERNACIONAL 24 (1949); Griffin, Supra note 
35, at 50; Hartig, whose views are discussed by Seidl-Hohenveldern, Austrian 
Views on International Rivers, 9 ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS SARAVIENSIS 191 (1961); 
Hostie, Problems of International Law Concerning Irrigation of Arid Lands, 
31 INT'L AFF. 61 (1955); Huber, Ein Beitrag zur Lehre von der Gebietschoheit an 
Grenzflussen, ZEITSC:fiRIFT FUR VoLKERREC:fiT UND BUNDESSTAATSRECfiT 160-63 (1907); 
Sauser-Hall, £'Utilisation Industrielle des Fleuves Internationaux, 83 RECUEIL DES 
CoURS ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 470, 517 (1953). 
00 Waters of International Rivers: Resolution, 1956 INT'L L. Ass'N CONF. REP. 216, 
242. See also Resolutions, 10 REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF INTER-AMERICAN BAR Ass'N 
CONFERENCE (1957) [hereinafter cited as INTER-AM. BAR Ass'N CoNF. REP.]; ECE REPORT 
61; 24 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 170 (19ll). 
01 The International Court has never referred to the writings of a single author as 
representing the "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations" under the STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 38, para. 1 (d). See LAUTERPACHT, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 23 (1958). 
oo See, e.g., Treaty Regarding Frontiers Between Costa Rica and Panama, May I, 
1941, 144 BRIT.ST.P. 751 (1941); Exchange of Notes Between the United Kingdom 
and Brazil, March 15, 1940, 75 U.N.T.S. 72 (1947), ECE REPORT 149; Water Rights on 
the Boundary Between Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi, Nov. 22, 1934, 139 BRIT.ST.P. 
746 (1935), Brit. T.S. No. 42 (1938); Treaty Between France and Germany Regarding 
the Delimitation of the Frontier, Aug. 14, 1925, 75 L.N.T.S. 264, 268; Agreement 
Between South Africa and Portugal Regulating the Use of the Water of the Kunese 
River, July l, 1926, 123 BRIT.ST.P. 593 (1926); Treaty with Great Britain, Feb. 24, 
1925, art. XI, 44 Stat. 2108, T.S. No. 721 (proclaimed July 17, 1925); Convention and 
Protocol Between Finland and Norway Respecting the Legal Regime Governing the 
Waters of the Pasvik and Jakobselv, Feb. 14, 1925, 122 BRIT.ST.P. 530 (1925); Conven-
tion entre Ia France et les Pays-Bas pour fixer conventionnellement la limite entre les 
colonies de la Guyane fran~ise et de Suriname, Sept. 30, 1915, IIO BRIT.ST.P. 872 
(1916); Convention entre la France et la Suisse pour l'Amenagement de la Puissance 
du Rhone entre l'usine projectee de Ia plaine et un point a determiner en a mont du. 
Pont de Pougny·Chancy-Berne, Oct. 4, 1913, IIO BRIT.ST.P. 886 (1916); Convention 
entre la France et l'Italie pour !'Utilisation des eaux de la Riviere Ia Roya et ses 
Affiuents, Dec. 17, 1914, 108 BRIT.ST.P. 467-68 (1914); Convention Between Sweden and 
Norway Concerning Lakes and Waters in Common, Oct. 26, 1905, 98 BRIT.ST.P. 828, 
829 (1905); Traite de Limites entre Leurs Majestes le Roi de Prusse et le Roi des 
Pays-Bas, June 26, 1816, 3 BRIT.ST.P. 720, 729 (1816-1818). For additional references, 
see BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-122 (1959); SMITH, op. cit. supra note 42, 
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recent of which will be noted here. Some of these recent treaty 
provisions make clear not only that unilateral appropriations to 
the substantial detriment of co-riparians are excluded, but they also 
provide concrete evidence of what constitutes "substantial detri-
ment" by explicitly acknowledging the avoidable harm to certain 
types of pre-existing uses. In our Case II, the existing irrigation 
canals in State Y represent such a prior use, and current treaty 
practice consistently harmonizes with the protection of this type 
of use wherever avoidance of injury is reasonably available. 
Foremost among these treaties is the Indus Water Treaty of 
1960,53 accommodating India's interest in harnessing the western 
rivers of the Indus basin for irrigation projects to serve India, with· 
out injuring pre-existing irrigation canals serving forty million 
Pakistani. To insure that the Pakistan projects would not be ad-
versely affected, it was agreed that currently unused eastern rivers 
would be diverted to replenish the supply of water taken from the 
Indus by the Indian projects. Significantly, India agreed to defray 
the cost of the replacement diversions, even though the cost will 
exceed one billion dollars; in doing so, it appears to recognize the 
very principle contended for by Y in Case II, i.e., that in utilizing 
an international river, X is obliged to use every reasonable means to 
avoid substantial harm to co-riparians. 
Similarly, the Nile Waters Agreement of 1959 between Egypt 
and Sudan bound both parties to limit prospective diversions in a 
manner which would not deprive existing uses in either country of 
water currently being employed.54 And in the Columbia River 
Treaty of 1960 between the United States and Canada, upper ripar-
ian flood control dams which might have been developed along the 
Peace River with disruption of the Columbia's flow to established 
downstream hydroelectric dams in the United States, were ulti-
mately agreed upon only after construction of the dams in Canada 
at 159-216; Hirsch, Utilization of International Rivers in the Middle East, 50 AM. J. 
lNT'L L. 81 (1956). 
""Reported and discussed, 123 WoRLD AFF. 99 (1960); Gupta, The Indus Waters 
Treaty, 1960, 9 FoREIGN AFF. REP. 153 (1960); 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 797 (1961). See 
also 1 REPORT OF THE INDUS COMMISSION (1950). See also Convention Between 
Yugoslavia and Austria Concerning Water Economy Questions Relating to the Drava, 
May 24, 1954, 227 U.N.T.S. Ill (1956), in which Austria agreed to indemnify 
Yugoslavia for damages resulting from Austrian interference with the flow of the 
Drava River. 
•• See 13 MID. EAST J. 422 (1959). 
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was planned so as to avoid any injury to existing uses.55 Along the 
southern border, the 1944 treaty between Mexico and the United 
States protected existing uses in both countries from harm which 
might othenvise have been threatened by future projects in either 
country.56 
Professor Berber has ·written critically, however, that treaties 
and parallel state practices are serviceable only as evidence of a 
rule of customary international law;57 "general principles" are not 
derived from these sources, but from abstraction based upon parallel 
municipal law practices of a large majority of civilized states. If 
Professor Berber is correct, the question arises whether a given treaty 
provision or a given state practice was adopted, (a) as an affirmation 
of what the parties understood to be required by customary law; 
(b) as in stipulated derogation of customary law; or (c) merely ad 
hoc, in the absence of any clear customary rule. Unless the treaty 
provision represents an instance of (a), it allegedly lacks the element 
of ojJinio juris) i.e.) adoption from a sense of juridical obligation, 
essential to give it any legal effect beyond committing the immediate, 
signatory parties to a private international law contract.58 Berber 
feels that none of the many treaties he has examined in this context 
clearly meets the opinio juris requirement, and thus he is quite 
scornful of efforts to generalize. While he is not alone in those 
views,59 it is possible that he has overstated the case.60 
Professor Hyde maintains that something less than a sense of 
00 See 44 DEP'T STATE BULL. 227 (1961); 12 EXTERNAL AFF. 870 (1960). Compare 
Johnson, Effect of Existing Uses on the Equitable Apportionment of International 
Rivers I: An American View, 1 U. BRIT. CoLUM. L. REv. 389 (1960) with Goldie, 
Effect of Existing Uses on the Equitable Apportionment of International Rivers II: 
A Canadian View, 1 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 399 (1960). 
00 Treaty with Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and 
Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Nov. 14, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 
(effective Nov. 8, 1945). 
01 BERBER, op. cit. supra note 28, at 45-46, 168-69, 185-86 (1959). 
08 I d. at 136-56. BERBER, SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE 
STUDY ON THE USE OF THE WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 8-10 (1957). See authori-
ties cited, note 88 infra; Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AM. 
J. !NT'L L. 662 (1953). 
00 Ibid. 
00 A strict opinio juris requirement might propound customary international law 
on the basis of mistaken impressions. "On the one hand it is said that usage plus 
opinio juris leads to such norm; that, on the other hand, in order to lead to such norm, 
the states must already practice the first cases with the opinio juris. Hence, the very 
coming into e.xistence of such norm would presuppose that the states acted in legal 
error." Kunz, supra note 58, at 667. See also KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND 
STATE 114 (1949). 
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obligation will suffice to validate parallel treaty provisions as a source 
of customary law.61 Professor Hudson believes that a sense of con-
sistency with international practice, rather than a sense of juridical 
duty, would suffice.62 Judge Lauterpacht agrees with the ojJinio 
juris requirement, but softens the burden of proof by creating a 
rebuttable presumption of its presence when the particular treaty 
provision is in line with a frequent and widespread practice.03 Pro-
fessor Schwarzenberger avoids the problem by urging that general 
state and treaty practices may at least evidence a "general principle" 
of international law, even should they fail to meet the harsher quali-
fications as evidence of some customary rule.04 
These mitigants of opinio juris are persuasive, if only because 
the rigour of opinio juris, when stringently applied, unrealistically 
impedes the development of international law. Treaty negotiations 
are seldom recorded and generally involve a host of policy con-
siderations for both parties. It is scarcely ever possible to isolate 
a particular reason to account for the character of the treaty, aside 
from declarations in the preamble or the body of the treaty itself. 
Treaty declarations that a particular provision was adopted because 
of or in spite of customary law are, understandably, very rare. 
But this does not mean that considerations of law may not have 
played a substantial part in the treaty settlement, or that the ad-
mixture of desire to conform with established norms and more politi-
cal considerations is without evidentiary value. It seems utterly 
unrealistic to divorce political considerations for adopting treaty 
provisions from juridical considerations, because the latter obviously 
play a substantial part in shaping and in "selling" the former, i.e., 
the bargaining position of a state is measurably strengthened to the 
extent that it can support its national demands on appeals to general-
ly observed, international practice. This, it seems, singularly ac-
counts for Pakistan's success in persuading the International Bank 
and India that India should defray the costs of replacing water 
01 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 1945). For related Views which SUb· 
stantially jettison an opinio juris requirement in the formulation of customary intcrna· 
tiona! law, see K.ELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 311·12 (1952); SIERRA, 
TRATADO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBUCO 25 (2d ed. 1955); Guggenheim, Les 
Deux :Elements de la cotltume en droit international, I ETuDES EN L'HONNEUR DE G. 
SCELLE 280 (1950). 
02 Hudson, Working Paper on Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. No. AjCN. 
4/16 (1950). 
03 LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 51, at 379-80. 
"'SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 39·49 (3d ed. 1957). 
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diverted from the eastern rivers; no other hypothesis is quite so 
consistent with the efforts of Pakistan's counsel to carry his case to 
the International Law Association on so many occasions, to debate 
for their support. 
The same borrowing from legal principles to buttress a national 
policy position is evident in the treatment of the Lake Lanoux 
dispute. Initially, France argued that it was entitled to divert water 
from the Carol River without substituting water from the Ariege 
River, even though this would have resulted in a substantially 
diminished flow from Lake Lanoux into Spain. Before carrying its 
case to the Court of Arbitration, however, France altered its position 
so as fully to protect Spain's interest in the undiminished flow. 
French policy probably would not have taken such a tum involving 
considerable expense to France, had it not felt that its position be-
fore a neutral arbitrator would be improved as a legal consideration. 
It therefore seems entirely reasonable that while we can seldom 
isolate opinio juris elements as alone accounting for the recent, 
general uniform willingness of states to use all reasonable means 
not to injure co-riparian interests, the coincidence and frequency 
of this policy is compelling; surely it is relevant for a court to con-
sider in resolving Case II. And if this is so, then the principle we 
have examined is a sound one. No treaty within the past twenty 
years has actually disregarded substantial interests of co-riparians, 
and only one has declared that the treaty provision is not to be con-
sidered representative of the parties' view of their duty. 
The Lake Lanoux decision is the only international tribunal 
decision involving sovereign states and the division of economic 
rights in international rivers. There are, however, a number of 
municipal decisions which, while not relevant immediately as 
judicial decisions under article 38 (a), may evidence "general princi-
ples" of international law under 38 (c), since they tend to reflect 
parallel state practices from which certain propositions applicable 
to the community of states can be generalized. 65 That a state must 
not affect the condition of the river whenever reasonably avoidable 
is agreed by all municipal courts which have had occasion to con-
sider the problem. Hastie has accurately characterized the Ameri-
"" See Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 35 Ar.r. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941); Hostie, 
supra note 49, at 69; 1 REPORT OF THE INDUS COMMISSION 54 (1950). But see BERBER, 
op. cit. supra note 58, at 4, 51; BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 171-72; Case of 
the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (1927) (dissenting opinion). 
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can cases in the following manner: "In all relevant cases, the 
[Supreme] Court has primarily applied a rule of law ... that a 
riparian State must abstain from causing substantial injury to 
another riparian State of the same river system, where appropriate, 
by diversion including storage."66 In 1927, the Deutsches Staats-
gerichtshof declared: "No State has the right to cause substantial 
injury to the interests of another State by the use it makes of the 
waters of a natural watenvay."67 The same proposition is recognized 
in the Rau Report which antedated settlement of the Indus River 
dispute by treaty,68 and again the view appears in dicta of the Italian 
Court of Cassation, in a 1939 decision involving clarification of 
Franco-Italian interests in the Roya: 
[A]lthough a State in the exercise of its right of sovereignty, may subject 
public rivers to whatever regime it deems best, it cannot disregard the 
international duty, derived from that principle, not to impede or to 
destroy, as a result of this regime, the opportunity of the other States to 
avail themselves of the flow of water for their own national needs.6D 
And notwithstanding his reluctance to use municipal practice as 
evidence of customary law, Professor Berber derives this much from 
municipal experience among civilized states: "Underlying almost 
every such system is a principle according to which the user must in 
some way take into consideration the use of water by other users."7° 
It is submitted that the "way" in which this consideration has uni-
formly been acknowledged is to condition the right of exploitation 
of a riparian state on the requirement that it use every reasonable 
means to avoid substantial injury to co-riparians. 
As an aspect of equitable apportionment, this rule has substantial 
predictive application. First, it means in the case of X versus Y that 
Y's objection to the X project should be sustained, since X could 
•• Hostie, supra note 49, at 68. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945), 
modified, 345 U.S. 981 (1953); Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572 (1940); Wyoming v. 
Colorado, 298 U.S. 573 (1936); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936); Wyoming v. 
Colorado, 260 U.S. I (1922); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Kansas v. 
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). Sec also 
BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 247-52 (1959); SMITH, op. cit. supra note 42, at 
105-17. 
67 ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 128 (Lauterpacht cd. 
1927-1928). 
68 1 REPORT OF THE INDUS COMMISSION (1950). 
•• Societe :Energie :Electrique du Littoral Mediterraneen v. Compagnia Impresc 
Elcttriche Liquri, ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW CAsES 121 (Lauter· 
pacht ed. 1938-1940). 
70 BERBER, op. cit. supra note 35, at 254. 
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avoid altering the river flow by either of two reasonable means. 
Second, taken in combination ·with the rule of law examined earlier, 
it means that in the event that X does install breakwaters to avoid 
any substantial harm to Y, X is then entitled to proceed with its 
hydroelectric project ·without further complaint from Y. This sim-
ply amounts to an application of the earlier rule, just as easily 
restated here in its traditional, negative tone as applied to Y: "No 
State is justified in opposing the unilateral action of another in 
utilizing waters, if such action neither causes nor threatens any 
appreciable injury to the former State."71 These elementary rules 
·will settle most of the cases where the facts make clear that use by 
one riparian can be secured without unavoidable harm to co-ripar-
ians. Where the hydroelectric dam threatens navigation, the rules 
suggest that the construction of the dam is conditioned upon the 
development by the proposing state of a navigable route around the 
dam. If it is a matter of irrigation for the proposing state, then the 
duty would be to replenish lower riparian rivers with other available 
streams, as in the Indus settlement. Again, it will subsequently be 
seen that these rules too are merely particular applications of the 
broader principle of equitable apportionment. 
CASE Ill 
State X's hydroelectric project (otherwise described in Case 
II), will accelerate the water of the Z River enough to quicken the 
erosion of a small island in the middle of the river just on the Y . 
side of the border. The island is useful only to support a summer 
cottage of a Y resident, and the island is worth ten thousand 
dollars. An installation of breakwaters necessary to avoid any 
damage to the island would cost X five hundred thousand dollars. 
At first glance the case appears to fall within the rule used in 
Case II, obliging X to take expensive precautionary measures before 
using the river. But the rule is qualified so that Y's objection would 
be sustained only if: (a) the unavoidable injury to its interests is 
substantial; or (b) although the unavoidable injury is not sub-
stantial, X refuses to offer adequate compensation for the damage. 
If measures are taken by X to compensate Y for the trivial damage, 
short of leaving the river exactly as it was due to the disproportionate 
expense of this measure, the combination of reasonable compensa-
tion ·with a residue of merely trivial injury to Y ought to free X to 
71 This is, of course, a restatement of the principle we derived from the discussion 
of Case I, supra, with the emphasis now resting more on an "abuse of right" theory. 
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develop its interest unilaterally. Thus, X could discharge its legal 
obligation by paying Y the money value of the island, much as 
Egypt has recendy agreed to compensate Sudan for the money value 
of land which will unavoidably be flooded from the waters of the 
Aswan Dam.72 This, of course, does not mean that Y has sustained 
no damage whatever, for certainly a state may prefer to have property 
to the property's money's worth. Nevertheless, the residue of dam-
age after compensation is so trivial in comparison with the five 
hundred thousand dollar cost of avoiding it altogether, that a court 
should consider the matter as de minimis and allow X to proceed 
with its project under our first rule. 
That trivial damage to a riparian is not sufficient grounds to 
thwart proposed uses by co-riparians, is well supported by many of 
the same authorities we have previously reviewed. The ECE Report 
declares: 
A State has the right to develop unilaterally that section of the waterway 
which traverses or borders its territory, insofar as such development is 
liable to cause in the territory of another State, only slight injury or 
minor inconvenience compatible with good neighborly relations,7a 
The Madrid Declarations of 1911 speak of forbidding only those 
unilateral appropriations which would "seriously interfere" or 
"seriously modif[y]" the river's fl.ow.74 Professor Smith condemns 
only that kind of unilateral action which threatens "appreciable" 
injury to co-riparian interests.76 
Illustrative treaty provisions include the Swedish-Nonvegian 
Treaty of Karlstadt of 1905, most significant because it is one of the 
few treaties which expressly rests the critical provision on interna-
tional law: 
Conforming to general principles of international law, it is understood 
that works ... shall not be executed in one of the two States without the 
consent of the other, every time that these works in affecting the water 
situated in the other State sensibly hinder the use of the water course 
72 See Nile Waters Agreement, 13 MID. EAST J. 422 (1959) (£15 million to com· 
pensate Sudan). 
73 ECE REPORT 61 (Emphasis added.) 
74 24 ANNUAIRE DE L'!NSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 170 (1911) (Emphasis 
added.); SMITH, op. cit. supra note 42, at 156; ECE REPORT 261. For similar treaty 
provisions, see, e.g., Convention Relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power 
Affecting More Than One State, Dec. 9, 1923, 36 L.N.T.S. 76, 81, Br. T.S. No. 26 
(1925); Convention entre la France et l'Italie pour !'Utilisation des Eaux de la Riviere 
la Roya et ses Allluents, Dec. 17, 1914, 108 BRIT.ST.P. 467·68 (1914). 
<G SMITH, op. cit. supra note 42, at 151. 
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for navigation or the floating of logs, or otherwise effect serious changes 
in the water over a considerable area.76 
Turning again to judicial decisions, note that the Donauver~ 
sinkung case denied the right of a state to act only where "sub~ 
stantial" injury was involved.77 And in the American case of Kansas 
v. Colorado, 78 the right of the upper riparian to utilize an interstate 
river for irrigation needs was sustained over proof by the lower 
riparian that some slight damage would result. Professor Sauser~ 
Hall has summarized the municipal practice of Italy and Switzerland 
in this manner: "A single principle appears to be generally respected: 
no alteration of a watercourse which would effect substantial preju~ 
dice to other riparians is allowable."79 
There is reason to believe, therefore, that a useful set of interna~ 
tionallaw principles is emerging to provide that a state may utilize 
an international river for economic purposes under any of the fol~ 
lowing conditions: 
a) Where the proposed use will have no effect on the flow of the 
water through coriparian states; 
b) Where the proposed use would adversely affect substantial 
interests of coriparians but the proposing state undertakes 
additional measures to safeguard the coriparian interests fully; 
c) Where the proposing state acts to avoid substantial injury oc~ 
casioned by its project and adequate compensation is made 
for the residue of injury which is not substantial. 
There remains to be considered a final and more difficult situa-
tion: the case where exploitation of the river by one riparian will 
necessarily have a substantial adverse effect on coriparians and where 
the means of avoiding injury is not reasonably within the economic 
capacity of the proposing state. 
CASE IV 
X and Y are contiguous national states through which the 
River Z passes. X is the upper riparian and proposes to divert a 
substantial part of the Z River for use in a massive hydroelectric 
7° Convention Between Sweden and Non•my Concerning Lakes and Rivers in 
Common, Oct. 26, 1905, 98 BRIT.ST.P. 828, 829 (1905). (Emphasis added.) See also 
I (2) FAUCHILLE, TRAI'rE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBUC 498·99 (1925). 
77 ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 128 (Lauterpacht ed. 1927-
1928). 
78 206 U.S. 46, 113, 114, 117 (1906); Hostie, supra note 49, at 61. 
70 Sauscr·Hall, supra note 49, at 471, 517. (Emphasis added.) 
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project which would convert X from a marginal agrarian economy 
to a prosperous industrial economy supporting ten million people 
within its 230,000 square mile area. Until now X has scarcely 
used the River Z. 
Y, the lower riparian, has gradually drawn upon the River Z 
in ever increasing measure to support its expanding agricultural 
basin. This basin is the principal source of Y's wealth; its surplus 
food production has enabled Y to achieve a favorable trade balance 
resulting in prosperity for the fifteen million Y inhabitants. As Y 
increased its irrigation supply from the Z River from time to time, 
its government notified the government of X of these develop-
ments. The government of X replied to each notice only with a 
terse statement that it acknowledged no right in Y to the continued 
fiow of the River Z, and that it would reserve all of its sovereign 
rights under international law. Some of the Y irrigation canals 
are more than one hundred years old; others have been completed 
within the last five years, and still others-at the time when X 
proposed to divert the river-were under construction. Some of 
the existing Y canals are extremely inefficient, losing large quanti-
ties of water through absorption, evaporation, and flooding from 
irregular levelling. Some of the most efficient canals serve areas 
in Y which are relatively unproductive. 
The diversion proposed by X would cut off more than eighty 
per cent of the Z River. It would take water away from more than 
fifty per cent of Y's arable land, ruin thousands of Y farmers, and 
impair the national economy of Y. While it would be possible to 
avoid this by returning most of the diverted flow to the Z riverbed 
after use in the X hydroelectric project, this could only be ac-
complished by a rerouting system on the X-Y border at the cost of 
three billion dollars, a figure somewhat in excess of X's entire 
annual gross national product. 
After prolonged negotiation, X and Y have reached an impasse: 
X is determined to proceed with the hydroelectric project to de-
velop its industrial potential, and Y is equally determined that it 
shall not lose its existing and projected irrigation system. By 
mutual agreement, the dispute is submitted for arbitration accord-
ing to "accepted principles of international law." 
One response would be for the court to determine which use, 
that of X or that of Y, enjoys a qualitative superiority over the other. 
This suggests that we should undertake a canvass of international law 
to develop a ranking of uses, with a ruling in favor of hydroelectric 
uses or irrigation uses, whichever is to be preferred. But aside from 
certain ad hoc rankings accomplished by treaty,80 and a few tradi-
80 Treaty With Mexico Respecting Utilization of Water of the Colorado and 
Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Nov. 14, 1944, art. III, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 
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tionaiists who ·stress the primacy -6£ navtgatmn; tne consensus· IS 
clearly that. no a priori' division of right's' 1can 'f>e s.ecu'ted 'in such. a 
superficial fashion. · · 
The ECE Report of 1952 concluded i'ts ··own· survey with this 
observado:p.: "Jt is diffiq:Ilt to establish·.priorities among. these in-
terests, and consequently difficult:to classify the u:ses to ·which the 
watenvays can be put.''82 · Similarly/Professor Sa1.1ser~PI.al1 has ·mcide 
art'j~de'~~n~enttevi~w oftreaty practiCe, C911cludinr:r.: The juridical 
situation remains in flux, full of unknmvns and uncer.tainties."83 
Smith,B4 Eagleton,85 Hirsch,86 and Griffin87 concur. It is obvious that 
intertiadonallaw could not reasonably resolve CtiSe 1V: by thkmeans, 
for·a:moment'sreflection makes clea'r that stares with an"·economy 
substantially' dependent upon ·Jell estilolished irrigation l1Ses In the 
pdsitio:n of y would not o~dinarily agree to the· aba:n-donmen't of 
these interests' merely because a coriparian proposed to harness the 
river for hydroelectric purposes; nor 'would states in the position of 
X customarily abandon the i111provement' of thetr economy by 
conceding that competing interestS or'coripariahs m Irrigation en-
joy an absolute priority. 'Even if states were inclined to regard a 
'river basin a.S an indivisible unit, and even if they would. defer to 
~he type of use, ()f greater benefit' to the greatest number of people~ 
the character of that more beneficial use obviously ,\rill vary from 
region to region: t~e ~mportance of navigation on. the Danube, for 
instance, clearly giving way to ~he pre~eminence. of 'irrigation on, 
the Indus. 
And, finally, settlement of disputes on this basis.would necessarilY. 
994 (effective Nov. 8, 1945);·Trea.ty With·G~ea~~Britain Relating to Boundary Waters 
Between the United States and Canl!da, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VIII. 36 Stat .• 2448 (effective 
May 13, 1910); 1 REPORT OF THE INDUS COMMISSION 11 (1950). 
81 I (2) FA.UCHII.U:, TRAITE DE DR.orr INTE\{NATIONAL Punuc'452;f(1D25):. !The matt;rials 
cited in note 80 supra, however, rank navigation after domestic, industrial and agri~ 
cultura.l ·uses. See alSo La.ylin, Principles of L'aw 'Gov'tmiing T:!Se of' Internationcil 
Rivers, 10 INTER-AM. BAR. Ass'N CONF. REP. 14 (1~57). . 
80 ECE REPORT 210. 
83 
'Saos'cr-Hall, sttpra note 49, at' 538. 
84 SMITH, THE EcoNoMic UsES oF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 152 1(1~!11); Smith, The 
Waters of the Jordan, 25 INT'L AFF. 415 (1949) • 
. •• Eagleton, The Use of, the W~ters of .International Rivers. 33 CAN: B• REv. lpts; 
1025 (1955). 
80 Hirsch, ·Utilization of International Rivers in the Middle1 East, 50 Alll. J• INT'L L. 
81, 99 (1956). 
81 State Dcp't Memorandum; Legal Aspects of' the· Use 'of :systems af International 
Waters, S. Doc. No. 118, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 90, 91 (19~8). Sec also . .1956. IN'(L L. 
Ass'N CoNF. REP. 216. 
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ignore the fact that certain types of uses have become important only 
in recent decades; thus, circumstances which might have supported 
the paramount significance of navigation on rivers in general are 
no longer applicable, if, indeed, they ever were. As noted by Berber: 
The uses of flowing water other than navigation, fishing and floatage 
were until recently either too unimportant to occasion serious examina-
tion, e.g., the use of water by mills, or else, although in themselves im-
portant, e.g., irrigation in arid countries, were too far removed from the 
main areas of international intercourse to attract the interest of inter-
nationallaw.ss 
A simple alternative solution might be to adopt a rule of in-
ternational law requiring an arithmetically equal division of any 
particular river's water, as followed in an Austro-Czechoslovakian 
treaty of 1928, and more recently in a Russo-Iranian treaty of 1959, 
affecting the waters of the Aras and Atrak rivers. But in neither of 
these cases was there any question at the time that the rivers would 
support projects contemplated by both parties, and thus there was no 
occasion to consider proper apportionment of a scarce commodity, 
as in Case IV. Moreover, there is othenvise no authority to support 
such a scheme, and again, arithmetical apportionment without re-
gard to the types of uses, their comparative value, their wastefulness, 
the relative population, arable land, degree of industrialization of 
each state, etc., renders the whole idea fanciful. 
A third approach would seem to be available, supported by a 
principle of prior consent and a principle which protects existing 
uses. Since X is the state which currently seeks to utilize the river 
in a manner inflicting substantial and unavoidable damage to Y, it 
might be thought that Y may prevail simply by withholding its 
consent and by demonstrating to a tribunal's satisfaction that X's 
proposed use violates a sic utere principle. Independently of this 
argnment, it might also rely on the primacy of her own existing uses 
as settling the matter, a suggestion traceable to Vattel who viewed 
a "first use" as perfecting a claim grounded in the tradition of terri-
torial sovereignty: 
[T]he nation that first established her dominion on one of the banks of 
the river is considered as being the first possessor of all that part of the 
river which bounds her territory. 
If that nation has made any use of the river, as, for navigation or 
88 BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1959). 
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fishing, it is presumed with greatest certainty that she has resolved to 
appropriate the river to her own use.s9 
The primacy of existing uses, as a principle which forecloses other 
riparians from drawing on an international river in a manner which 
would disrupt those uses, has been enthusiastically supported by 
John Lay lin who represented Pakistan in the recent dispute with 
India over the Indus River system.90 Largely through his efforts, 
it has also generated support within a number of international law 
associations. 91 
A number of recent treaties apparently acknowledge the in-
violability of pre-existing uses, even without questioning their pos-
sible lesser value to the river system as a whole. In apportioning 
60 VA TIEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 120 (1870). 
00 
"As a rule, the protection of uses, lawful when they came into existence, so long 
as they remain beneficial, has been treated as an absolute first charge upon the 
waters. . . . In less favored regions, not only are existing uses protected, but as be-
tween existing uses those first established ordinarily enjoy a priority over uses estab-
lished later." Laylin, supra note 81, at 12. See also 1956 INT'L L. Ass'N CONF. REP. 12; 
Laylin 8: Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication in· International Water Disputes, 53 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 30, 38 (1959). 
01 See, e.g., First Report of the Committee on the Uses of the Waters of Interna-
tional Rivers, 1956 Il\T'L L. Ass'N CoNF. REP. IV (1956). 
For additional support of pre-existing uses, see I REPORT OF THE INDUS Co:.rMiss!ON 
10-11 (1950) ("In the general interest of the entire community inhabiting dry, arid 
territories, priority may usually have to be given to an earlier irrigation project over 
a later one: 'priority of appropriation gives superiority of right.' ''); Convention of 
1923 ratified by Great Britain, Northern Ireland, New Zealand, Denmark, Greece, Siam, 
Southern Rhodesia, and Newfoundland, art. 2, 36 L.N.T.S. 76, 81 (1925); Convention 
Between Persia and Russia defining the Boundary Between the Two Countries East 
of the Caspian Sea, Dec. 9, 1881, art. IV, 73 BRIT.ST.P. 97 (1882); Decret de 
l'Empereur des Fran<;aise, portant promulgation du Traite de Delimiation conclu, 
le 26 Mai, 1866, entre la France et l'Espagne, July 14, 1866, art. X, 56 BRIT.ST.P. 212, 
226 (1866); Convention de Delimitation, entre les Pays-Bas et la Belgique, Aug. 8, 
1843, art. 37, 35 BRIT.ST.P. 1202 (1847); Traite de Limites entre Leurs Majestes le 
Roi fde Prusse et le Roi des Pays-Bas, June 26, 1816, 3 BRIT.ST.P. 720 (1816); U.N. 
SECURITY COUl\CIL OFF. REc. 8th year, 649th Meeting 21 (SjPV.649) (1953); Hearings 
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Treaty With Mexico Relating to 
the Utilization of the Waters of Certain Rivers, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 19-21 
(1945); Report of Special Master, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 7 Original, 
Oct. Term, 1943, p. 109: "A rule that would seem elementary in equitable distribu-
tion (even aside from legal right based on priority statutes) is that present rightful 
uses should be preferred to prospective uses under possible future development.'' To 
some extent, the suggestion has found favor with Andrassy, who illustrates its opera-
tive effect in the following manner: "Certain developments and constructions have 
taken place before the conflict of interest and the necessity for regulation made 
themselves felt. In such a case, one applies the principle of acquired rights. The 
priority of the existing fact is respected, since needs have already been adapted 
to those possibilities created by this previous construction." Andrassy, Le Droit 
Intemationa[ De T'oisinage, 79 RECUEIL DES COURS ACADE:.IIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
77. ll9 (1951). 
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the Nile River, the Sudan agreed that the disproportionately large 
share which Egypt was already using for irrigation purposes would 
be recognized.92 But the case is not entirely on point, for the ap-
portionment' of the surplus greatly favored Sudan so as to redress 
the historic imbalance, and it appeared that the proposed uses in 
both· countries could be accommodated from the whole river ·without 
substantial. damage to the interests of either-a saVing feature criti-
cally absent from Case IV. Moreover, the treaty was not considerate 
of Tanganyika, Ethiopia, or the Congo, all of which may feel preju-
diced by the one hundred per cent division between Sudan and 
Egypt. TJ,lus the primacy of pre-existing uses along the Nile has 
not yet finally been tested. 
It is true also that India has agreed to underwrite the cost of . 
diverting eastern rivers to protect the pre-existing uses in Pakistan, 
and that the cost of this replacement exceeds one billion dollars.D::J 
But, again, the case is distinguishable; in Case IV, the damage to Y 
is not similarly avoidable because the cost of the rerouting system 
exceeds three billion dollars and could not reasonably be sustained 
by a country as small or poor as X. Indeed, in the Indus River case 
itself, the cost of avoiding harm to Pakistan in fact is borne largely 
by the World Bank and the United States Government. 
The Columbia River Treaty of 1960 would appear to support 
pre-existing use protections, since Canada ultimately abandoned its 
threat to develop flood control dams by diverting water from the 
Columbia River so as to cut off supply to existing hydroelectric 
dams in the United States.94 But this too was simply another case 
where the threatened harm was wholly avoidable by reasonable 
means, and the case better fits under our second principle than 
here.95 Moreover, in return for constructing the dams to increase 
the amount and uniformity of flow on the United States side, Canada 
secured an agreement by the United States to share equally in all 
power increases attributable to the Canadian dams, an example of 
developing the basin as a whole, rather than· apportionment of 
severable assets. This agreement by the United States would not 
have been required had the United States felt secure in relying 
entirely on the primacy of pre-existing uses, since the power plants 
•• See note 54 supra. 
93 See note 44 supra. 
•• See note 55 supra. 
•• Ibid. See also discussion .in text at notes 45-71 supra. 
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which will benefit from the Canadian program already existed along 
the river on the American side; the United States might therefore 
have asserted that it needed to make no concessions whatever, in 
restraining Canada from diverting the river. 
In another area of the world, the Russo-Iranian treaty of 1959 
protects pre-existing Iranian uses, but this is not convincing towards 
establishing such protection as an axiom of international, law be· 
cause the river appeared to both parties as capable of supporting 
their mutual needs without any substantial adverse effect ·on the 
interests of either.96 
The primacy of pre-existing uses as a tentative rule of law must 
be discounted, however, not merely because there is but meager 
authority to support it, but because the reasons given to support it 
are not convincing in every context-certainly not in Case IV. The 
first of these reasons has already been alluded to by Andrassy, that 
pre-existing uses are to be respected "since needs have already been 
adapted to those possibilities created by this previous construction."97 
The same persuasion is offered by Laylin, that prior appropriations 
have resulted in a dependent relationship which it is essentially un-
fair to disturb by subsequent demands on the limited resources of 
a river. The problem is, however, that although this dependent 
relationship is relevant, it can hardly be allowed to tyrannize over 
other considerations without producing even more unfortunate con-
sequences for the river basin considered as a whole. In Case jv, 
while it is clear that pre-existing irrigation uses in Y have contrib-
uted much to theY economy, it is also clear that many of the canals 
are enormously wasteful and that others serve relatiyely unproduc-
tive areas. It seems wholly unrealistic to condemn or foreclose the 
development of the X economy, with its promise of benefiting a 
larger number of people and in a more efficient manner, merely 
because Y's uses were prior in time. It seems doubtful too that Y 
may reasonably rely upon its investment and dependence on its irri-
gation system to prevent X's proposed diversions, since X at no time 
misled Y as to X's interest in the river flow, and at all times made 
clear that it regarded its vital interests as untrammeled by the Y 
developments. 
The other reason commonly brought fonvard to support the 
00 See 13 MID. EAST J. 193 (1959). 
07 Andrassy, supra note 91, at 119-21. 
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protection of pre-existing uses is the incentive '\vhich such a rule 
provides to promote the rapid and complete utilization of river re· 
sources: by agreeing that one prior in time is prior in right, interna· 
tiona! law would encourage the timely utilization. of waters which 
might othenvise · continue to run uselessly to the sea for lack of 
security for any state to make necessary investments, unhampered by 
a rule of prior consent. 
Again, however, the rule giving primacy to pre-existing uses 
exceeds the merit of the reason offered in its behalf; adoption of the 
rule as a principle of international law would result in river com· 
munities repenting at leisure what was constructed in haste. The 
economic future of X is blighted because Y was fortuitously able to 
devise a cheaper use of the river water in simple, but wasteful, irriga· 
tion canals, while X was obliged to wait for technological advances 
and the acquisition of greater financial means. \Vater uses are hur· 
ried along by one country from apprehension that coriparians may 
othenvise succeed in establishing some other absolute first claim. 
No equitable solution of Case IV can be derived from a myth that 
existing uses are always to be protected against any subsequent pro· 
posals, even where substantial harm to those us~s is not reasonably 
avoidable by any unilateral action of the proposing state. 
Nevertheless, there is some element of sense in the doctrine 
of pre-existing uses which may provide a guide when employed more 
flexibly, as one consideration within a larger principle. It would be 
sound to place primary empliasis on a rule which will facilitate the 
fullest development of the river for the whole community. What 
is needed is a formulation which will"combine the legitimate aspects 
of both doctrines-that of prior consent and that of existing uses-to 
assure the expeditious apportionment of river benefits in the most 
equitable manner consistent with full utilization of the river system. 
To the extent that respect for prior consent guarantees that no 
legitimate aspiration of any interested riparian shall be ignored in 
developing a river basin, its requirement as a matter of law is to be 
applauded; it is to be deplored only if it is taken to confer an 
unqualified veto, enabling each riparian to frustrate river develop· 
ment except on its own terms. To the extent that the protection of 
pre-existing uses encourages a riparian to develop a river system by 
providing assurance that projects carefully constructed cannot be 
disregarded cavalierly by subsequent coriparian developments, it 
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too is a laudable principle; it is to be deplored only if it is taken to 
insulate every antique or extravagant use from review, no matter 
how little its comparative value to the contemporary community 
may be. 
These elements, just as the regional superiority of a certain type 
of use, the presence of certain treaty arrangements, technological 
changes, comparative dependence of economies upon the river, 
etc., are obviously relevant but not independently conclusive con-
siderations in the equitable apportionment of an international river 
treated as an integrated whole. Just as Case IV has elements in 
common with nearly every recent river dispute, and yet itself is dif-
ferent from them all at least in the altered prominence of one feature 
over another, so it is obviol..!s that none of the considerations within 
the overriding principle of equitable apportionment can be con-
verted into law suitable by itself for every system; each simply repre-
sents an interest which competes for protection in each case, more 
or less relevant as it contributes to the expeditious development of 
the river system as a whole, with due regard for the several interests 
of all riparians. 
And this, it is now becoming clear, is what is generally meant 
by the principle of "equitable apportionment" as it has been applied 
in American municipal law,98 in the settlement of the Indus,99 the 
0
' "[D]isputes [over interstate rivers] are to be settled on the basis of equality of 
right. But this is not to say that there must be an equal division of waters of an 
interstate stream among the States through which it flows. It means that the 
principles of right and equity shall be applied having regard to the 'equal level or 
plane on which all the States stand, in point of power and right, under our constitu-
tional system' and that, upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending 
States and all other relevant facts this Court will determine what is an equitable 
apportionment of the use of such waters." Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 
660, 6i0·71 (1931). "But if an allocation between appropriation States is to be just 
and equitable, strict adherence to the priority rule may not be possible. For example, 
the economy of a region may }lave been established on the basis of junior appropria-
tion•. So far as possible those established uses should be protected though strict 
application of the priority rule might jeopardize them." Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 
U.S. 589, 618 (1943). See Washington v. Oregon, 29i U.S. 517, 523-24 (1936) (wasteful 
existing uses not treated as a fixed charge on the river); see cases cited notes I, 66 
sujJm; Hostie, Problems of Intemational Laa• Concerning Irrigation of Arid Lands, 31 
IxT'L AFF. 61 (1935). 
00 Xote 44 supra. "It follows from [these principlesl that the rights of the se\'eral 
units concerned in this dispute must be determined by applying ... the rule of 
'equitable apportion,' each unit being entitled to a fair share of the waters of the 
fndus and its tributaries." 1 REPORT OF THE lXDl'S COMMISSION 10·13 (1950). "The 
watet· resources of the Indus basin should be cooperatively developed and used in 
such manner as most effectively to promote the economic development of the Indus 
basin viea•ed as a unit." Letter by Eugene Black, President of the ·world Bank, 
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Columbia,100 the Nile,101 the Oder,102 or the Joz:dan103 river disputes, 
or in the resolutions of the International Law Association.104 The 
same principle emerges clearly under various names put forward by 
other writers. Thus, Hartig has written of a "principle of co-
herence,"105 and the President of the International Bank was firm in 
declaring that the Indus river was to be "used in such manner as 
most effectively to promote the economic development of the Indus 
basin viewed as a unit.''106 Professor Eagleton has spoken of the' 
"integrated river system," and the "unified system,"107 while Fortuin 
of the Netherlands speaks of the "fullest possible profit," and Gar-
land of "full utilization."108 Professor Sauser-Hall has observed 
the phenomenon of equitable apportionment at work in state prac· 
tice in the following way: 
We are confronted with a remarkable illustration of an international 
practice not based originally on precise rules, but which has moved so 
consistently toward a consensus of concordant unilateral acts that it 
ultimately served as a basis for a treaty manifesting the idea of a com· 
in Berber, The Indus Water Dispute, 6 lli:DIAll: YB. INT'L AFF. 46, 57 (1957). (Emphasis 
added.) The resulting treaty closely conforms to this suggestion. 
100 See text at note 96 supra, and at note 110 infra. 
101 Note 54 supra. 
102 
"But when consideration is given to the manner in which states ha\'e l'cgardcd 
the concrete situatiQns arising out of the fact that a single waterway tra\'Crscs or 
separates the territory of more than one state, and the possibility of fnlfilling the 
requirements of justice and the considerations of utility which this fact places in 
relief, it is at once seen that a solution of the problem has been sought not in the 
idea of a right of passage in favour of upstream states, but in that of a community 
of interest of riparian states. This community of interest in a navigable river be· 
comes the basis of a common legal right, the essential features of which are the 
perfect equality of all riparian states in the use of the whole course of the river 
and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any riparian state in relation to 
others." Judgment No. 16, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 23, at 27 (1929). 
103 See Dees, jordan's East Gho1· Canal Project, 13 MID. EAST J. 357 (1959). 
10
' See 1958 1:-:T'L L. Ass'N Col':F. REP. 28; Principles of Law Governing the Uses of 
International Rivers, 1956 lli:T'L L. Ass'N Co:o:F. REP. 241. Sec also Resolutions, 10 
INTER-AM. BAR Ass'11: Coli:F. REP. at 82 (1957); Textc Definitif de Ia Resolution tel 
qu'Audoptc au Cours de Ia Seance, lnstitut de Droit International, translated in 56 
AM. J. INT'L L. 737 (1962): "Considering that the maximum utilization of available 
natural resources is a matter of common interest .•• if the States arc in disagreement 
O\'er the scope of their rights of utilization, settlement will take place on the basis of 
equity, taking particular account of their respective needs, as well as of other 
pertinent circumstances." Id. 
105 Ein neuer Ausgangspmzkt fiir intemationale wasserrechtliche Regulungl'll: etas 
Koharenz[Jrin:ip, 1958 ·wASSER· Ul'\D ENERGJE·WIRTSCHAFT; Scidl-Hohcnveldcrn, Austrian 
Views 011 International Rivers, 9 AxxALES UI\1\'ERSITATIS SAR.\VIEXSIS 191 (1961). 
100 See letter cited note 99 supra. (Emphasis added.) 
107 Eagleton, supra note 85, at 1021-23. 
10s Icl. at 1028. 
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munity of interests founded on good neighbor relations entirely subject 
to international law.1oo 
The principle of equitable apportionment has gained impressive 
support from treaties and juridical decisions as well as from highly 
qualified publicists.110 Its fundamental emphasis is upon the maxi-
mum utilization of fluvial resources of a .river basin treated as a 
whole. 
This principle will not, of course, operate to parcel a river in 
the same fashion in every case-no more than does the "due process" 
or "equal protection" clauses of the United States Constitution 
act identically on differing facts. 111 It does, however, provide 
1
"" Sauser-Hall, L'Utilisation Industrielle Des Fleuves Intemationaux, 83 RECt:EIL 
DES Col'RS, Ac\obnE DE DROIT 1.-;TERXATIONAL 471, 581-82 (1953). (Emphasis added.) 
110 See Resolution, 24 ANNUAIRE DE L'I:'\STITUT DE DROIT INTERXATIONAL 365 (1911); 
Griffin, Legal AsjJects of the Use of Systems of Intemational Waters, S. Doc. No. liS, 
85th Cong. 2d Sess. 90 (1958): "Riparians are entitled to share in the use and benefits 
of a system of international waters on a just and reasonable basis.... In determining 
what is just and reasonable account is to be taken of rights arising out of ..• comparison 
of the economic and social gains accruing, from the various possible uses of the 
waters in question, to each riparian and to the entire area dependent upon the waters 
in question." ld. (Emphasis added.) Smrn, THE Ecmm:-.nc USES OF INTERXATIOXAL 
RIVERS (1931): "The first principle is that every rh·er system is naturally an indivisible 
physical unit, and that as such it should be developed as to render the greatest possi-
ble set·vice to the whole human community which it serves, whether or not that com-
munity is dh·ided into two or more political jurisdictions." Id. at 150-51. See also 
Cardona, El Regimen ]uridico de los Rios lnternacionales, 56 REv. DE DERECHO 
1:-.TERNACIOXAL 24 (1949); ECE REPORT at 60. 
For supporting cases, see, e.g., Donauversinking Case, ll6 Entscheidungen des 
Reichgerichts in Zivilsachen, Anhang IS (1927), also reported in A:-.:-.uAL DIGEST OF 
PUBLIC 1:-.T'L LAw CASES 128 (Lauterpacht ed. 1927-28): "An attempt must be made 
to apportion or measure the respective interests in an equitable manner balancing 
the advantages gained by one state against the injury, or possible injury, caused to 
another." Id. Leitha River Case, I HACKWORTH, 1.-;TERNATIO:'\AL LAw 594 (1940); 
Aargau v. Zurich, Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts aus dem' Jahre 
1878, noted by Schindler, The Administration of justice in the Swiss Federal Court 
in Intercantonal Disputes, 15 A:-.r. J. 1::-;T'L L. 149, 169-72 (1921). See also cases cited 
in Austin, A Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 C.-1..-;. B. 
REv. 393, 433-34 (1959). 
For supporting treaties, see, e.g., Franco-Hispanic Treaty of 1866, arts. IX, X, 56 
BRtT.ST.P. 212, 226 (1866); Treaty with Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of 
the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, art. 8, 59 Stat. 
J219, T.S. No. 994 (Xov. 8, 1945); Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary 
Waters Between the United States and Canada, art. VIII, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548 
(Jan. ll, 1909); Agreement between France and Turkey relative to Cilicia, art. XII, 
Il4 BRtT.ST.P. 771 (1921); Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern 
art. 6, Brit. T.S. No. 28 (1923); Convention of 1923 Relating to the Development of 
Hydraulic Power Affecting More Than One State, Dec. 9, 1923, art. 2, 36 L.X.T.S. 76, 
81; Franco-Turkish Protocol of 1930, translated by Hirsch, 50 A:-.r. J. l:o;T'L L. 81, 86 
(19:16) from the Rapport a Ia Societe des Nations sur Ia situation de Ia Syrie et du 
Liban 177 (1930). 
111 "(X]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
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a primary interest which riparian states may reliably employ to 
predict the probable result of a dispute submitted to a netural tribu-
nal. It will, for instance, clearly subordinate the claims of absolute 
sovereignty, prior consent, sovereign integrity, and pre-existing use 
to the paramount concern of developing the river basin as a unit. 
Moreover, equitable apportionment does not address itself to the 
court's subjective and personal conscience, but to a weighing of 
interests in a manner conforming to general practice and with an 
end view of maximizing benefits of the river system as an integrated 
whole. In precisely the same fashion, the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly applied the law of the fourteenth amendment after a 
scrupulous review of the following considerations: 
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the 
manner in which this was clone, the reasons for doing it, the available 
alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit 
in the [state] whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt com-
plained of and good accomplished-these are some of the considerations 
that must enter into the judicial judgment.112 
The application of due process standards is more than merely 
an appeal to the conscience of the Court. Indeed, the Court has 
frequently made clear that it does not fashion due process standards 
from the Justices' private views of fairness, and that it is bound, 
rather, to seek them in less personalized sources of law. Equally, 
the principle of equitable apportionment may reasonably be re-
garded as an emerging law wholly susceptible of judicial application, 
even though it too is not encapsuled in a verbal formula possessing 
the ingratiating clarity of a simpler, more rigid principle. 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws." U.S. Co:-:sT. amend. XIV. 
Procedural due process is assuredly a meaningful const!tutional mainstay in the 
United States. :\fr. Justice Frankfurter has obsen·ed that "the histcry of Iibert\" has 
largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards." i\fcXabb v. l'nited 
States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). Xor is it any less "law" simply because the Court 
"has always declined to give a comprehensh·e definition of it, and has preferred that 
its full meaning should be gradually ascertained by the process of inclu~ion and ex· 
elusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise." Twining- v. Xew Jersey. 
2ll U.S. 78, 100 (1908). The same can be said for the principle of equitable apportion· 
ment as an emerging rule of international law. For other judicial descriptions of 
procedural due process, no more specific in their fashion than what we have said of 
equitable apportionment, see Palko , .. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 32.3 (193i) ("[pro· 
cedures] implicit in the concept of ordered liberty .. .''); Herbert \'. Louisiana, 2i2 
U.S. 312, 316 (1926) ("fundamental principles of liberty and justice n·hich lie at the 
base of all our civil and political institutions.") 
110 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (19:31). See 
also Karst, Legislative Facts i11 Constitutional Litigation, 1960 St'l'. CT. REV. 7,;, 
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To be specific, we can briefly look to the facts of Case IV and 
suggest certain conclusions as to the adjudication of this dispute 
under a principle of equitable apportionment. First, it is not con-
sistent with maximum utilization of the Z River, treating the basin 
as an integTated whole, to jeopardize X's plans in order to maintain 
those canals in Y which are wasteful. As a minimum requirement, 
Y should be held responsible for improving the canals to minimize 
los~es from absorption, evaporation and flooding. In the absence of 
any showing that the water thus saved can more usefully be employed 
or shared by 1', X may utilize that water in its hydroelectric projects 
without taking costly measures to restore its flow into r. \Vater 
might also reasonably be withdrawn from the unfertile areas of Y 
for use in the X facilities where it would be more economically em-
ployed, especially if X were to compensate Y for the meager loss of 
benefits occasioned by the withdrawal. 
If this proposed arrangement would still not provide enough 
water for a substantial hydroelectric installation in X, an alternative 
arrangement might be feasible: maximum use of the river can be 
secured both for hydroelectric and irrigation uses if the rerouting 
costs are shared. The costs, in accordance with equitable apportion-
ment, should be allocated between the states according to their 
relative abilities to pay and the relative benefits they will receive 
from the river (including any arrangement X might make with Y 
to share the power produced in X's dams), with due regard for the 
efficient uses already existing in Y. 
It is clear, of course, that a court cannot directly dictate the 
particular terms of an agreement between X and Y. It can only 
pass on the validity of one party's objection to the position that the 
other party has taken. But in testing the position of each party 
against the principle of equitable apportionment, the court clearly 
influences negotiations by its anticipated decision on the validity 
of the complaining state's objections. Before repairing to the 
Court of Arbitration in the Lake Lanoux case, as we have previously 
noted, the French coupled their proposed diversion with an offer to 
replenish the lake from other sources, correctly anticipating the 
favorable influence this offer would have with the Court of Arbitra-
tion in disposing of the subsequent Spanish complaint. In short, 
mutual awareness of a prospective decision based on equitable ap-
portionment may be expected to induce good faith negotiations so 
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that each state may legitimately claim it has acted to encourage 
development of the river basin as a whole. 
The pressure for good faith negotiations is not exerted on the 
proposing scate alone, for should an objecting state not couple its 
objection with any counter-offer to the proposing state's plan, it 
stands in danger of being defeated in court under a decision holding 
that the proposing state is entitled to proceed. 
In this larger view, the first three principles of international law 
we examined earlier are simply specific applications of equitable ap-
portionment where the position taken by the prevailing state ·was 
reasonable under the facts of each of those cases) i.e.) it was condu-
cive to maximizing the benefits of the river system with due regard 
for the several considerations we have reviewed here. In Case IV, 
neither state has presently advanced a proposal ·wholly consistent 
with equitable apportionment, and thus neither could gain by 
seeking an arbitral decision. Since the present use of the water is 
clearly more satisfactory to Y than to X, one might expect that X 
would alter its position during negotiations first, perhaps in the 
direction indicated above, to share the costs of the rerouting system. 
The burden of initiative does not necessarily fall always on the 
proposing state, however, for it could just as easily be that X ·wotlld 
proceed with its project; then Y would be obliged to come fonvard 
with a more reasonable proposal to complement its objection 
to X's imminent diversion, in order to win an arbitral decision en-
joining X's project. 
It has not been the purpose of this article merely to catalogue 
treaties or to review once again the myriad problems in establishing 
a given proposition objectively as a rule of international law. It is 
reasonably clear, however, that the parallel practices of states in 
recent times, and the consensus of highly qualified publicists, sup-
port the unifying principle of equitable apportionment ·which has 
been illustrated here. On balance, the principle enjoys sufficient 
authoritative support, and is sufficiently coherent in its application 
to disputes involving economic interests in international rivers to 
render such controversies justiciable according to international law. 
